Why is NZ spending far more on responding to climate disasters than on reducing future risk?

By Cathrine Dyer and Robert McLachlan

A flood warning sign as waters rise in a street

New Zealand is not on track to adapt to growing climate risks, nor is it cutting emissions quickly enough, according to the latest reports issued by the Climate Change Commission. Last week, the commission published an evaluation of progress on New Zealand’s adaptation plans, arguing that communities are exposed to greater risk of damage and costs while the government continues to delay decisions about who should pay. Earlier this year, the commission pointed out that 97% of the government’s spend on natural hazards since 2010 has been on responding to and recovering from disasters, with only 3% going towards reducing future risk. Its latest report warns that the present course risks making things worse.

Here are two examples of the challenges councils and home owners are already facing.

In South Dunedin, about 6,000 houses are at risk of flooding and sea-level rise this century. Following lengthy community engagement, seven possible responses have been developed, ranging from pumping water to large-scale retreat. They cost between NZ$2 billion and $10 billion and would save varying numbers of homes. The council has now asked for another more engineering-based response (pumps and seawalls) to be added. But the commission warns such responses may constitute “maladaptation” and calls for clearer direction and support from the government.

Another example is insurance. Premiums have risen sharply since January 2023, when Auckland experienced one of New Zealand’s worst floods. In flood zones, some people (perhaps 4%, the commission estimates) cannot get insurance at all. But “insurance retreat” – when people cannot afford to fully insure their home – is potentially worse. The extent of retreat is not known, because data are not collected.

Politicians have an incentive to avoid blame

Adaptation decisions are complex, expensive and come with a high risk of policy failure. Researchers have developed a blame avoidance framework to explain how politicians weigh up visibility (how much attention an issue attracts) against avoidability (who will be blamed for failure) before deciding on a course of action. This can lead to inaction, which in turn risks derailment when impacts from physical climate events begin to overwhelm efforts to transition to a more stable and resilient world.

Minister for Climate Change Simon Watts recently proposed a law change that would require councils to make adaptation plans for communities at high risk from climate change hazards. But he has not indicated where funding would come from, instead insisting cost-sharing would be determined in the next term of government. This sets up a future scenario in which central government avoids blame while councils are instead blamed for failing to implement their own plans.

Decarbonisation efforts slow down

If New Zealand is not adapting at the pace and scale climate risks demand, the commission’s earlier report on efforts to curb emissions paints a similarly bleak picture. The report shows 82% of the reductions needed to meet the carbon budget for 2026-2030 are now at risk, as are 99% of cuts required for 2031–2035.

Three main sectors – electricity, agriculture and transport – are now at significant risk of not delivering their share of emissions reductions.

For electricity, this is because of slow progress towards solutions for dry years (when renewable generation from hydro power is reduced) and periods of peak demand during winter. Meanwhile, the government continues to pursue a proposed import terminal for liquefied natural gas, which could delay the phase-out of gas in industry and unsettle investment decisions in renewable energy.

The agriculture sector is now forecast to miss its 2030 target because the government cancelled pricing agricultural emissions, instead relying on technologies such as methane inhibitors and vaccines, which have not yet arrived.

Transport is responsible for 55% of New Zealand’s carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion. But the government has weakened clean vehicle standards. Had New Zealand stuck with the original standards introduced in 2021, carbon dioxide emissions would be 500,000 tonnes lower each year and $650 million in annual fuel costs would have been avoided. Instead, 203,000 fossil-fueled light vehicles were imported in 2025. They will be on the road for decades to come.

Reliance on emissions trading

The commission’s report shows the rate of emissions cuts has halved since 2023. But some of the cuts after 2023 were due to deindustrialisation and a weak economic recovery, which tended to suppress emissions. Neither are preferred pathways.

The government continues to rely on the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) as its main policy instrument, but the Climate Change Commission warns it is unlikely to effectively drive emissions cuts by the early 2030s because it does not provide a strong decarbonisation signal for either fossil fuels or forestry. Agriculture is not in the ETS, and some industries receive free credits; overall, the ETS captures only 36% of New Zealand’s gross emissions. Research shows that relying on a single instrument like the ETS will not lead to the rapid emissions cuts and transformation of the energy system needed to meet upcoming targets.

Internationally, the gap between the emissions cuts required to stay below 2°C of warming and the reductions promised by countries under the Paris Agreement is widening. A recent study of 21 countries and the EU found the risk of missing targets is linked to lacking political will – for example, by weakening targets or not monitoring policy effectiveness. This in turn is associated with weakened civil societies and entrenched fossil fuel interests. In this respect, New Zealand is not alone.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Which climate scenario should we plan for?

By Robert McLachlan

In the Manawatū region of New Zealand where I live, the Horizons Regional Council plans for climate change impacts under the high-emission “RCP8.5” scenario. This is a scenario in which no attempts are made to reduce emissions – the track we were on for decades. In this scenario, emissions triple by 2100 and coal burning expands by a factor of six.

This is now considered highly unlikely. So why is it still used for planning?

The Ministry for the Environment recommends

using the middle-of-the-road scenario (RCP4.5) and the fossil-fuel intensive development scenario (RCP8.5), and screening hazard and risk assessments for longer-term coastal impacts up to 2130 (RCP8.5).

RCP4.5 reflects moderate emissions and implementation of current global emissions reduction policy settings. It represents limiting the rise in global air temperature to 2.7°C by 2100.

RCP8.5 broadly aligns with emissions-reduction practice over the past few decades. It reflects high emissions, limited mitigation measures and no global emissions reduction policy settings. This scenario represents a rise in global air temperature to 4.4°C by 2100. RCP8.5 enables local government to understand the full extent of possible climate risk. It is particularly important for developments with a long timeframe (more than 100 years), especially for climate-sensitive projects and coastal planning activities, due to the very long time-lag (from decades to centuries) between sea level rising and seeing the effects on developments.

Ministry for the Environment. 2022. National adaptation plan and emissions reduction plan. https://environment.govt.nz/assets/publications/national-adaptation-plan-and-emissions-reduction-plan-guidance-note.pdf

RCP8.5 is relevant not just as a worst-case scenario of emissions. The key point is that it gives an idea of a bad-case outcome for the climate response even under moderate emissions. For that reason, only RCP8.5 should be used for planning; RCP4.5 still allows a completely unacceptable level of risk.

Climate change predictions are highly uncertain. One measure is the “Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity”, the increase in temperature in response to a doubling of CO2, after short- and medium-term feedbacks have entered equilibrium. (“Medium-term” means decades to a few centuries). This has long been estimated at 2–4.5 ºC, with an average of 3 ºC. We are currently at just over half a doubling, resulting in 1.3 ºC of warming, although not all those feedbacks have yet run to equilibrium.

2–4.5 ºC is a wide range, and that’s only the “most likely” values – a 66% probability. If the sensitivity is actually on the high side, then even moderate emissions will lead to much greater impacts.

There are two fundamental reasons why the uncertainty is so large and has proven difficult to reduce.

First, there are many climate feedbacks. Some lead to more warming and some to cooling. Each is hard to predict accurately because of the long time scales and complicated interactions of the atmosphere and ocean.

Combining effects of the same sign needn’t increase uncertainty:

A = 10 ± 1 (10% uncertainty)

B = 10 ± 1 (10% uncertainty)

A + B = 20 ± 2 (10% uncertainty)

But combining effects of opposite sign always increases uncertainty:

A = 10 ± 1 (10% uncertainty)

B = –5 ± 0.5 (10% uncertainty)

A + B = 5 ± 1.5 (30% uncertainty)

Secondly, the uncertainty is worse on the high side:

Here the most likely response is 3 ºC, but very large values (6 ºC or even higher) are possible. In the most recent IPCC report (AR6) the most likely range was reduced somewhat, to 2.5 ºC–4 ºC. However, this was due in part to discarding a number of “hot models” that showed higher sensitivity. (In those models, forecasts of less clouds meant less sunlight reflected directly back to space, and hence more warming.) And that was done for a good reason, namely that the mid-range models fit the observed warming extremely well:

The takeaway message is that even under moderate emissions, there is still a pretty decent chance of catastrophe.

Allen Fawcett et al., Can Paris pledges avert severe climate change? Science, 2015.

Here the “no policy” scenario (RCP8.5) gives a 90% chance of more than 3 ºC of warming by 2100. But even “Paris–continued ambition” (which assumes that all countries in the world achieve their 2030 targets and continue decarbonising at the same rate) has a 42% chance of exceeding 3 ºC. Only “Increased ambition”, in which decarbonisation accelerates greatly after 2030, gives a decent 14% chance of avoiding 3 ºC. That’s an “extreme climate change” scenario, with up to 60% of the global population at risk of starvation.

Risk is a funny thing. For aircraft, we think a 1-in-10 million chance of a crash is an acceptable level of risk. If a crash is linked to a design flaw, the entire global fleet of that model is grounded indefinitely. For flooding, we’ve settled on a 1-in-500 annual risk of catastrophic urban flooding in any given location. (In Palmerston North, stop banks were upgraded to that level just in time to survive the 2004 floods.) For climate change, a 50-50 risk of complete annihilation is met with “that’s the best we can do”.

Some unfinished business on climate

The recent general election has resulted in sweeping changes in climate policy in New Zealand, but the commitments to the Zero Carbon Act, to meeting the climate budgets, and meeting our Paris Agreement target, remain. When the article below was published in short form in the newspaper, the editor chose the headline “The good news on climate change – and the rest“. This led to some debate online. Was it really good news? Or could the title equally well have been “The bad news”? I thought that for an international audience “New Zealand votes for a higher carbon tax” would have been a good lead.

Regardless of that, here is the full article from the November 2023 issue of Policy Quarterly.